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A Note on the Taxation of Capital





The transition of the eastern European countries into market-based economies
and their potential integration into the European Union raise questions about
how their capital income tax systems should be structured and to what extent
they are in line with the rest of Europe. This note presents a brief analysis of the
tax systems currently in place and considers what issues should be of concern in
setting tax policy in the future. The impact capital income taxes have on the
incentives for firms to invest in the Czech Republic and Poland is described
using a marginal effective tax wedge and an average effective tax rate.
Simulations of some simple reforms are also presented. First, some brief
comments are made on what the optimal tax policy for smaller capital-importing
countries might be and how this should inform policy in the transition
economies.
The standard theoretical literature on optimal taxation in a small open
economy suggests that residence-based taxation is optimal, implying that the tax
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rate on inward investment should be zero. This depends on the assumption that
capital is perfectly mobile and that investors seek to earn the same post-tax rate
of return in all locations. In simple models, an increase in capital taxes leads to
an outflow of capital which drives up the pre-tax rate of return until the post-tax
rate of return is again equal to that in other locations. This means that the
incidence of the tax is not on the owners of mobile capital. Instead, as capital
flows out of the country, the return on immobile factors declines, implying that
the burden of taxation falls on these immobile factors. A dead-weight loss arises
as a result of the lower utilisation of capital, which would be avoided if the
immobile factors were taxed directly.
2 One case where this may not hold is when
the capital-exporting country operates a credit system for taxing foreign-source
income. In this case, the optimal tax rate on inward investment for the capital-
importing country is the same as for the capital-exporting country.
3 This is
because, under a credit system, the income earned abroad will be taxed at home
but with a credit given for any foreign taxes paid on that income. The effect of
reducing tax on inward investment to zero is simply to transfer tax revenue from
the capital-importing to the capital-exporting country. In practice, countries
operate a range of systems, as indicated in Table 2. This makes setting policy
difficult, since the optimal tax on inward investment from some countries will be
zero, while from other countries it will be positive, although a partial solution
could be to charge withholding taxes at differential rates on income repatriated
to different countries.
One modification of the simple framework is when firms can earn economic
rent.
4 The level of economic rent may vary between locations for a number of
reasons, and governments can, in principle, capture the economic rent that is
specific to their location. So, for example, if a firm locating in country A earns a
higher rate of return than if it operated in B because of the proximity of some
natural resource, then country A would be able to raise tax up to the point where
the post-tax rates of return in the two countries were equal, without affecting the
firm’s investment decision.
While the theoretical literature does not give any clear policy
recommendations, it does seem to imply that, in general, small capital-importing
countries should not have higher effective tax rates than large capital-exporting
countries, and indeed they may want to have lower tax rates in some cases. It
should be noted, however, that there are reasons for taxing capital that have not
been addressed here that may lead to a positive tax rate being optimal. For
example, capital income taxes can act as an anti-avoidance device against the
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non-payment of labour income taxes. It may also be that, for administrative or
other reasons, it is difficult to raise revenue from other forms of taxation.
Before turning to a description of the tax systems, consider what the
appropriate measure of tax is. The theoretical literature in general is concerned
with the marginal effective tax rate. This is the marginal tax rate on the marginal
investment — that is, an investment that just earns the post-tax required real rate
of return. There are at least two other measures that may be relevant for different
reasons. The average effective tax rate (AETR) is the appropriate measure for
considering incentives to locate economic-rent-earning investments. Consider a
firm choosing between several locations to build a single factory from which it
expects to earn an economic rent. The cost of capital will influence the optimal
level of output chosen by the firm. However, the proportion of the profits that
the firm keeps after tax depends on the AETR. Therefore both marginal (through
the cost of capital) and average effective tax rates will influence the firm’s
locational decision. The statutory tax rate can provide a good approximation to
the AETR for high economic-rent-earning investments and is also the relevant
measure for considering incentives to shift income between jurisdictions — for
example, through transfer pricing. All three of these measures are considered
below.
The next section describes the tax systems currently in place in the Czech
Republic and Poland, while Section III investigates the burden of tax on
investment. The results indicate that tax rates on capital income are currently
higher in the Czech Republic and Poland than in the other countries considered.
Some simulations of the impact of simple policy reforms are presented to give an
indication of the magnitude of change that might be needed to bring taxes in the
Czech Republic and Poland into line with those of the main OECD countries.
II. THE TAX SYSTEMS
Tables 1 and 2 summarise the corporate tax systems in place in the Czech
Republic and Poland in 1995, along with those in France, Germany, the
Netherlands, the UK and the US.
5 These additional countries are considered
because they are large capital-exporting countries. The statutory tax rates in the
Czech Republic and Poland are higher than those in the other countries (with the
exception of the rate applying to retained earnings in Germany). In addition, in
both the Czech Republic and Poland, depreciation allowances are low, implying
that the tax base is larger than in the other countries. Another important feature
of corporate tax systems is the method for valuing inventories. There are two
                                                                                                                                   
5 These tax data are largely taken from the Price Waterhouse ‘Doing business in ...’ guides. See OECD (1991),
the Ruding Committee (1992), Devereux and Pearson (1995) and Chennells and Griffith (1996) for more
detailed descriptions of EU and OECD tax systems. For some discussion of eastern European tax systems, see
Mintz and Tsiopoulos (1991) and Heady, Rajah and Smith (1994).Fiscal Studies
94
TABLE 1




















e 10% for four years,
5% for next three
years, 2.5% for
remainder of life










UK 33% 4% 25% using DB FIFO 2.5%





Czech 42% 1% for first year,
2% for remainder of
life
14% using DB with
extra FYA of 10%
FIFO 10.0%
Poland 40% 1% 20% using DB LIFO 27.0%
aThese are national tax rate on corporate income. Many countries have lower rates for small and medium-sized
enterprises. Many countries also tax capital income at the state or provincial level; where information was
available, an average of local taxes was included in the calculations of effective tax rates.
bBuildings are generally depreciated by the straight-line method, except in the Netherlands and Poland where
they use declining balance.
cDB: declining balance; SL: straight-line; FYA: first-year allowance.
dSource:  OECD Economic Outlook 1995, except for Czech Republic and Poland which come from The
Economist’s ‘Emerging Markets Indicators’, 9-15 September 1995.
eGermany operates a split-rate system. The rates are 48 per cent for retained earnings and 32 per cent for
distributions.
commonly used methods: LIFO (last in, first out) and FIFO (first in, first out).
Under the FIFO system, all the end-of-period stock is assumed to be recently
acquired and therefore is valued at today’s prices, whereas under LIFO, it is
assumed that the items held at the beginning of the period are still held. This
means that under the FIFO system, nominal increases in the value of inventories
are taxed, whereas under the LIFO system, they are not. All countries allow
firms to use FIFO, while some countries also allow the option of using LIFO, as
indicated in Table 1.Taxation of Capital Income
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TABLE 2
Method of Integration and Treatment of Foreign-Source Income
Method of integration of
personal and corporate taxes
Treatment of foreign-source income
Dividends Interest
France Imputation Exempt (95%) Credit by source
Germany Split-rate and imputation Exempt Credit by source
Netherlands Classical Exempt Credit by source
UK Imputation Credit by source Credit by source
US Classical World-wide credit World-wide credit
Czech Imputation Credit by source Credit by source
Poland Classical Credit by source Credit by source
The generosity of capital allowances is influenced by inflation. If capital
allowances are given on the historic, rather than replacement, cost of the asset,
then the present value of allowances falls as inflation rises. Inflation also affects
the present value of interest deductibility, making it higher in times of high
inflation.
Table 2 describes how corporate taxes are integrated with the personal taxes
of domestic shareholders, and gives the treatment of foreign-source income. The
way in which personal and corporate taxes are integrated can have a significant
impact on the relative incentives of companies to finance investment from
retained earnings or new equity. There are basically three types of system in
operation in these countries: (i) imputation, (ii) split-rate and (iii) classical. An
imputation system is where some portion of corporate taxes can be offset against
the individual’s income tax liability. In a split-rate system, there are different
statutory tax rates for distributions and retained earnings at the corporate level.
In a classical system, distributions are taxed at the corporate level and then again
at the individual level.
The treatment of foreign-source income determines the impact that the home
country tax system will have on cross-border investment flows. Under an
xemption system, foreign-source income is exempt from corporation tax in the
home country. Where credit is given by source, a credit is given on an item-by-
item basis for the tax paid on foreign-source income. This credit can be offset
against the tax liability in the home country. An alternative to this is a world-
wide credit, where credit is given on the total amount of tax paid on all foreign-
source income.Fiscal Studies
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III. EFFECTIVE TAX RATES
A standard measure for summarising the impact of the tax system on the return
earned on capital is the cost of capital.
6 The cost of capital is the rate of return a
firm needs to earn before tax in order to make a required minimum return after
tax. The cost of capital reflects the marginal effective tax rate in that it measures
the impact of tax on a marginal investment.
7 In the tables below, the marginal
effective tax wedge (METW) is presented. This is the difference between the
required real rates of return before and after tax. It can be thought of as the
additional return needed to cover the cost of capital income taxes, and
incorporates the statutory tax rate, the structure of the tax system and the
definition of the base into one measure.
The figures in Table 3 are the METWs on a domestic investment. These are
calculated for each type of asset and finance and then averaged. In the first three
columns, the METWs for investment in the three different assets are averaged
across types of finance. In the next three columns, the METWs for investment
financed in the three different ways are averaged across assets. The overall
average in the final column is averaged across all three types of finance and all
three assets. It is assumed that the inflation rate is 3.5 per cent in all countries,
which allows a comparison of the METWs abstracting from differences in actual
inflation rates, and that the marginal investor is exempt from personal taxes.
There are some common patterns across countries. For example, investments
financed by retained earnings are generally taxed at a higher rate than those
financed by other forms of finance, and investment financed by debt is generally
taxed at a lower rate. This is because, in all countries, interest payments are
deductible from taxable income while there is no comparable relief for retained
earnings. Overall, the METWs in the Czech Republic and Poland are higher than
those in the other countries considered. This is due to a combination of their
statutory tax rates being higher and their depreciation allowances being lower.
To identify the impact of each of these differences, in the final two panels of
Table 3, the METWs for two policy experiments are shown for the Czech
Republic and Poland. In the first, a statutory tax rate of 35 per cent is used which
is more comparable to that in the other five countries, rather than the ones shown
in Table 1. This lowers the METWs but not to the level of those of the other five
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() ρδ + π − δ
 where A is the net present value of depreciation allowances, τ  is the statutory tax rate, ρ  is the discount rate, δ
is the economic depreciation rate and π  is the inflation rate. The economic depreciation rates used are 3.6 per
cent for buildings, 12.25 per cent for plant and machinery and 0 per cent for inventories.Taxation of Capital Income
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TABLE 3
Domestic Marginal Effective Tax Wedges









France 1.2 -0.5 3.5 3.7 -4.0 -2.2 0.8
Germany 2.4 0.5 4.5 7.0 -3.1 -4.6 1.9
Netherlands 1.8 0.4 2.3 4.0 -0.7 -2.5 1.2
UK 2.0 0.6 3.9 4.2 0.5 -1.8 1.7
US 4.4 0.9 3.8 5.4 5.4 -2.9 2.5
Czech 5.0 2.4 6.3 7.1 7.1 -1.9 4.0
Poland 5.3 2.2 3.5 6.2 6.2 -2.0 3.4
Policy experiment: Statutory tax rate of 35 per cent
Czech 3.7 1.7 4.7 5.3 5.3 -1.5 2.9
Poland 4.3 1.7 2.9 5.0 5.0 -1.7 2.7
Policy experiment: Depreciation rates for buildings of 5% SL and for plant and
machinery of 30% DB for three years switching to 10% SL for the remainder of the
assets’ life
Czech 3.0 0.7 6.3 5.5 5.5 -2.8 2.6
Poland 3.4 0.6 3.5 4.7 4.7 -3.0 2.0
Note: The METW is the difference between the post-tax and pre-tax required real rates of return. The post-tax
required real rate of return is assumed to be 10 per cent, so an METW of 1.2 implies a pre-tax required real rate
of return (i.e. a cost of capital) of 11.2 per cent.
Weights (source: OECD, 1991):
Assets: buildings 28%; plant and machinery 50%; inventories 22%.
Types of finance: retained earnings 55%; new equity 10%;debt 35%.
countries. In the second policy experiment, the original statutory tax rates from
Table 1 are used, but the depreciation rates are set higher to make them more
comparable to those in the other five countries. This brings the METWs down
further and almost in line with those of the other five countries. This suggests
that it is the lower depreciation allowances, rather than the higher statutory tax
rates, that have the greater impact in raising the METWs above those in the other
countries.
As was noted above, an important consideration in analysing effective tax
rates is the interaction of economic variables, particularly inflation, with the taxFiscal Studies
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TABLE 4
Domestic Marginal Effective Tax Wedges








France 1.3 -0.4 3.1 3.3 -3.4 -1.9 0.8
Germany 2.4 0.5 4.9 6.8 -2.7 -4.2 2.0
Netherlands 1.9 0.5 2.6 3.8 -0.4 -2.1 1.3
UK 2.0 0.7 3.6 4.0 0.6 -1.6 1.7
US 4.4 0.8 4.1 5.2 5.2 -2.3 2.6
Czech 4.1 2.6 9.0 8.9 8.9 -3.8 4.4
Poland 1.6 1.7 -0.6 7.9 7.9 -11.3 1.2
Policy experiment: Indexed for inflation, LIFO in Czech
Czech 2.8 -0.1 2.4 5.9 5.9 -7.3 1.3
Poland 1.4 -2.1 -0.6 5.7 5.7 -12.9 -0.8
Weights: As Table 3
system. In Table 4, the actual inflation rates shown in Table 1 are used for each
country. This table highlights the effect that differences in economic conditions
can have on METWs. Generally, the METW is higher on inventories in
countries that use FIFO valuations than in countries that use LIFO. It is lower on
debt in countries with high inflation than in countries with low inflation. The
METW is also lower on debt in countries with high statutory tax rates than in
countries with low statutory tax rates, since high rates increase the present value
of interest deductibility. The effects of inflation can be somewhat mitigated by
indexation. This is shown in the policy experiment in the lower panel of Table 4.
Indexing capital allowances for inflation and using LIFO for inventory valuation
in the Czech Republic brings the METWs down significantly.
In a closed economy, the cost of capital gives an indication of the impact the
tax system has on the incentive to invest. In an open economy, the impact of tax
is more complicated and depends, among other things, on the extent to which
capital can move freely between countries. The cost of capital is not, however,
informative about the impact of tax on investment projects that earn economic
rent — that is, projects that have a rate of return that is higher than the minimum
required rate of return. The average effective tax rate (AETR) is the relevant
measure in this case.Taxation of Capital Income
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The AETR presented here is calculated using a similar methodology to that
used to calculate the cost of capital;
8 however, rather than being based on a rate
of  return, it is the proportion of economic rent that is taken in tax. To calculate
the figures here, a pre-tax economic rent of 30 per cent has been assumed. As
economic rent tends towards zero, the AETR will tend to infinity (if any taxes
are paid), and as economic rent rises, the AETR will tend towards the statutory
tax rate.
Table 5 shows the METWs and AETRs for international investment from one
country into another. These are weighted averages of the METWs for the three
types of finance and three assets. As in Table 3, inflation is held constant at 3.5
per cent across countries, focusing on differences in the tax systems. Note that
the diagonals in the first panel are the domestic METWs as shown in the final
column of Table 3.
There are two ways to think about the results in Table 5. The first is to
consider an entrepreneur in the Czech Republic or Poland who wants to raise
finance for an investment project. What are the incentives for the entrepreneur to
raise finance on the local market relative to raising it through a foreign
multinational? The last two columns show the METW and AETR on inward
investment into the Czech Republic and Poland. The tax burden on foreign
inward investment from all countries is higher than on domestic investment
(indicated in bold). This is true not only for the Czech Republic and Poland but
for most other countries as well. The AETRs are also higher for foreign inward
investment than for domestic investment. These results indicate that both tax
systems favour domestically financed investment over foreign investment.
A second way of analysing these figures is to consider a foreign multinational
deciding where to locate a new factory. Comparing the figures across the rows
gives an indication of the impact the tax system has on the relative incentives for
where to locate the factory. Again, the METWs and AETRs on domestic
investment are generally lower than those on international investment, and those








where R is the present value of economic rent, superscript NT indicates in the absence of tax and superscript T
indicates in the presence of tax. Rent is equal to value minus costs (where costs in the absence of tax are unity),
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TABLE 5
International METW’s and AETRs




France Germany Netherlands UK US Czech Poland
METWs (percentage points)
France 0.8 1.2 2.3 2.3 3.1 4.0 3.5
Germany 2.6 1.9 2.7 3.1 3.4 4.9 4.3
Netherlands 2.3 1.6 1.2 2.8 3.2 4.7 4.1
UK 2.1 1.5 2.2 1.7 2.9 4.4 3.8
US 2.5 2.2 2.6 3.0 2.5 5.0 4.4
Czech — — — — — 4.0 —
Poland — — — — — — 3.4
AETRs (pre-tax economic rent=30%)
France 32% 37% 57% 59% 70% 87% 73%
Germany 49% 36% 45% 55% 62% 88% 72%
Netherlands 66% 49% 38% 71% 77% 101% 87%
UK 62% 47% 59% 51% 74% 98% 84%
US 64% 55% 61% 70% 56% 102% 87%
Czech — — — — — 83% —
Poland — — — — — — 69%
Weights (source: OECD, 1991)
Parent finance: retained earnings 55%; new equity 10%; debt 35%.
Subsidiary finance: 33% each.
Parent finance weights used for domestic investment.
Assets: buildings 28%; plant and machinery 50%; inventories 22%.
into the Czech Republic and Poland are higher than those into the other
countries.
In Table 6, the same two policy experiments that were simulated in Table 3
are presented for the international METWs and AETRs. The first experiment
sets the statutory tax rates in the Czech Republic and Poland to 35 per cent. As
was the case for domestic investment, this reduces both the METWs and AETRs
for investment into the Czech Republic and Poland but does not reduce them to
the level of those in the other countries. The second experiment instead gives




(no personal taxes, inflation constant, fixed exchange rate)
Statutary tax rate of 35% Depreciation rates for buildings of
5% SL and for plant machinery of
30% DB for three years switching
to 10% SL for the remainder of the
assets’s life
Capital importer: Czech Poland Czech Poland
Capital exporter
METWs (percentage points)
France 3.1 2.9 2.6 2.1
Germany 4.0 3.7 3.5 3.0
Netherlands 3.7 3.5 3.3 2.8
UK 3.4 3.2 3.0 2.5
US 3.0 3.6 3.5 3.0
Czech 2.9 — 2.6 —
Poland — 2.7 — 2.0
AETRs (pre-tax economic rent=30%)
France 72% 66% 70% 56%
Germany 68% 60% 70% 55%
Netherlands 84% 77% 84% 70%
UK 81% 73% 80% 67%
US 83% 75% 84% 70%
Czech 69% — 66% —
Poland — 61% — 52%
Weights: As Table 5.
AETRs further; in this case, Poland has METWs and AETRs close to those in
the other countries.Fiscal Studies
102
IV. SUMMARY
As was discussed in the Introduction, optimal tax theory does not give very clear
guidance for tax policy in eastern European countries. On the one hand, simple
theoretical models suggest the need for low, or zero, taxes on capital inflows.
However, it is possible that governments may be able to raise revenue from
location-specific rents and through some redistribution of tax revenue (where the
capital exporter operates a credit system) without seriously affecting incentives
for investment.
Tax rates on capital income are currently higher in the Czech Republic and
Poland than in the other countries considered. Inflation exacerbates these
differences, not because of the structure of the tax system but simply because it
is higher in the Czech Republic and particularly Poland than in the other
countries. Indexation of capital allowances and inventories would considerably
reduce the problems arising from higher inflation. Further, relatively small
changes in both statutory tax rates and the tax base bring the METWs and
AETRs more in line with those in these other countries.
A caveat to this note is that the discussion presented in this paper has not
considered the need for governments to raise revenue. Other options to raise
revenue may be limited for administrative or other reasons, and immobile factors
may be difficult to tax. The analysis also has not considered how firms respond
to these differences in after-tax rates of return. Both of these considerations
could alter the policy conclusions significantly. However, it seems unlikely that
the best policy for the Czech Republic and Poland is to set marginal and average
taxes higher than other (east or west) European countries.
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